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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether certain types of management control systems 
(MCSs) dominate in certain societies (socio-cultural contexts) and whether the effectiveness of 
a given type of MCS varies depending on the socio-cultural setting—the society—in which it 
operates. The study focuses on three socio-cultural groups and the corresponding institutional 
contexts (an Anglo-Saxon group, a Central European group, and a Northern European group) 
and three MCS styles, or types (delegated bureaucratic control, delegated output control, and 
programmable output control). We use unique data from a cross-national, interview-based sur-
vey encompassing 610 strategic business units from nine countries (seven European countries 
plus Canada and Australia). The idea that firms tend to adapt MCSs to the socio-cultural context 
does not gain empirical support in this study. No significant differences in the distribution of 
MCSs between the three socio-cultural groups are noted. However, we do find that program-
mable output control has a more positive impact on effectiveness in Anglo-Saxon cultures, 
while delegated output control has a more positive impact on effectiveness in Northern Europe. 
Taken together these findings indicate that distinct differences between societies make a par-
ticular MCS design more appropriate in a given society, but where such differences are not 
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1. Introduction  
What explains the design and use of management control systems (MCSs)? This question is 
fundamental to management control scholars and has generated an impressive body of 
knowledge (Chenhall, 2003). Empirical researchers have focused largely on how various con-
tingency factors interact with MCSs, while less attention has been paid to the institutional con-
texts in which these interactions take place. Generally, the question pertaining to how the design 
and use of MCSs, and their effectiveness, may be influenced by the institutional contexts in 
which they operate is rarely addressed by contingency scholars. This is surprising considering 
that the central point of the contingency framework is the importance of context in understand-
ing the design, use, and effectiveness of MCSs. This implies that observed relationships be-
tween contingencies and MCSs are presented as universally valid across institutional contexts, 
a circumstance that ought to spur contingency researchers within the MCS literature to think 
differently. Moreover, the lack of attention to institutional context may help explain the some-
what inconclusive results that have been reported in this stream of studies. 
This outlook is supported by insights from a critical examination of perspectives used to explore 
the basis of differences in cross-country MCSs. Bhimani (1999) compares the conventional 
contingency theory perspective with four alternative perspectives: ‘the culturist perspective’, 
from which nationally rooted cultural forces are seen as developing nationally specific solutions 
to control problems; ‘the business system perspective’,1 from which MCSs are seen as embed-
ded in societal institutions; ‘the new institutionalism perspective’, from which MCSs are seen 
as reproduced and reflecting taken-for-granted practices; and ‘the “new” history perspective’, 
from which contemporary MCSs are seen as reflecting historical political, socio-cultural, and 
economic changes. The study notes that the contingency perspective’s reliance on “universal-
ism and functionalism” (p. 434) is problematic because there are convincing arguments that the 
impact of conventional contingency factors on MCSs as revealed in cross-country research is 
restricted or even eliminated by socio-cultural or institutional factors (see Bhimani (2007) for 
an overview of the literature). 
In this study we follow the lead of Whitley (1999a), who adopts the business systems frame-
work (see also, e.g., Maurice, 1979; Sorge, 1991; Sorge & Maurice, 1993; Sorge & Warner, 
                                                          
1  Bhimani (1999) terms this research track “societal effects” but in the present paper we refer to it as the “busi-
ness system” framework because this is the concept most frequently used in the literature (Maurice, 1979; 
Sorge, 1991; Sorge & Maurice, 1993; Sorge & Warner, 1986; Whitley, 1992). 
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1986; Whitley, 1992) to explain the existence and effectiveness of various types of MCSs 
within various business systems.2 According to this framework, the conditions that enable ac-
tors to engage in economic activities are explained by their societal or socio-cultural context, 
i.e., a combination of value-based institutions (such as socio-cultural ideas and attitudes about 
trust, authority, loyalty, or individual rights) and proximate societal institutions (such as capital 
markets, education systems, and trade unions). Together these institutions shape, and are influ-
enced by, the business system in a society (Whitley, 1992). Because institutions, and hence 
business systems, vary between societies, firms face varying conditions from one society to 
another and therefore behave differently depending on the society in which they operate. These 
explanations of organizational behavior and design parallel arguments from transaction cost 
economics (North, 1991; Williamson, 1998) which, apart from the link between transaction 
characteristics and governance structure, is also a theory of the comparative efficiency of gov-
ernance structures (market, hybrid, and hierarchy) under varying institutional conditions (rules 
of the game). In contrast to the transaction cost framework, however, business systems theory 
also more thoroughly examines both the industry and organizational levels. This makes it pos-
sible to adapt the framework to an MCS point of view since societal institutions are not only 
linked to contingencies (such as uncertainty) but also to administrative arrangements such as 
planning, performance measurement, and work organization. For example, managers delegate 
responsibility because they trust in a society’s rules and procedures (societal institutions) but 
also because they trust employee skills (which depend on public training systems), the relative 
power of employees (which depends on the strength of unions), and a willingness to share risks 
(which is indirectly influenced by the way in which business finance is organized in a given 
society). 
The number and complexity of factors that constitute this framework may initially seem over-
whelming, but because many factors are thought to be interdependent and/or complementary, 
only a limited number of societal configurations appear in empirical research—in terms of in-
                                                          
2  The business system framework has been used for analysis of firm-level and management characteristics in 
individual countries (e.g., Halvorsen et al., 1996; Lilja & Taino, 1996) and sectors/regions (e.g., Räsänen & 
Whipp, 1992; van Iterson, 1996) as well as for comparative studies between countries (e.g., Lane, 1997; Sorge 
& Warner, 1986). It has also been applied in studies of the development of innovative competencies (Casper 
and Whitley, 2004; Whitley, 2000, 2002), corporate governance (e.g., Hartzing & Sorge, 2003), and globali-
zation and organizational change (Kristensen & Morgan, 2012; Lane, 2006; Morgan, 2009). 
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stitutional arrangements, i.e. types of societies and MCSs (Whitley, 1999a, 1999b). A configu-
rative approach to this issue has the potential to add to our knowledge of interactions between 
institutions at the societal level and MCSs at the organizational level. Such an approach re-
sponds to calls in the literature for more accounting research applying a configurative approach 
(e.g. Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998; Bedford & Malmi, 2015). 
Whitley’s article (1999a) is conceptual and his propositions pertaining to relationships between 
societies and MCSs are tentative. Departing from Whitley, we elaborate on the classification of 
MCSs in a way that is more in line with common typologies of MCSs used in the accounting 
literature. Furthermore, because neither strong theory nor a deep understanding of empirical 
circumstances exists regarding exactly how institutional context and MCSs interact, we develop 
hypotheses related to both the congruence and the contingency structural form of fit between 
institutional contexts and MCSs (Gerdin & Greve, 2004). Departing from Whitley (1999a), and 
using studies on empirical classifications of countries into types of society (Hotho, 2014), we 
test hypotheses about whether certain types of MCSs dominate in certain societal types and/or 
whether MCSs differ in effectiveness across societies. 
Using a cross-country data set covering 610 strategic business units, we show that MCSs vary 
in effectiveness (measured by return on assets—ROA) with the socio-cultural contexts in which 
they operate. To the best of our knowledge we offer the first large-scale empirical evidence of 
the importance of society–MCS fit and as such we add important knowledge to the contingency-
based literature on MCS design and use (Hartmann, 2000; Chenhall, 2003; Gerdin & Greve, 
2004). Our hypotheses related to the domination of certain types of MCS in certain societies 
find no support, which seems logical considering that the presence of the contingency form of 
fit decreases the likelihood of finding evidence of the congruence form (Gerdin & Greve, 2004). 
Our findings thus imply that in today’s business system landscape MCSs travel and become 
established widely in organizations across societies (Granlund & Lukka, 1998). Still, the appro-
priateness of such MCSs when implemented across societies varies significantly. Such a finding 
should not only contribute to scholarly knowledge but also be practically relevant to managers 
and consultants. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section presents a taxonomy of 
societies or socio-cultural contexts (derived from the business system framework) followed by 
a discussion of society as a contingency factor. Special attention is dedicated to possible adap-
tation behavior and to various forms of fit. Thereafter, we extend Whitley’s typology of MCSs 
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and derive hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data collection procedure, the measurement of 
variables, and the statistical methods used for testing the hypotheses. The results of the statisti-
cal analysis are presented in Section 4. The final section discusses the results, presents the re-
search contributions of the study, highlights limitations, and, finally, provides some suggestions 
for further research. 
 
2. Theory 
2.1 Society as a contingency factor 
Whitley maintains that institutions vary from one society to another. Institutions influence or-
ganizations and decision-making, while organizational features in turn are closely linked with 
MCS characteristics. He lists six institutional factors that combine to form institutional contexts 
and suggests a typology containing six generic types of societal configurations (Whitley, 1999a, 
1999b) The validity of the typology has been empirically tested with data from 30 OECD coun-
tries for the years 2000–2011, as reported by Hotho (2014).3 Generally, Hotho’s study confirms 
the empirical existence of four of the six societal types suggested by Whitley (1999b), but it 
also identifies a type not previously discussed. Reflecting the availability of data, the present 
study focuses on MCSs in two of the societal types presented in Whitley (1999b) and the novel 
type added by Hotho (2014). The three types are presented in Table 1. 
 
 
   Table 1 about here 
 
 
The labels and attributes of the two first types are based on Whitley’s (1999b) typology while 
the attributes of the “new” type come from Hotho (2014). When Whitley (1999a) discusses 
MCSs he refers to institutions as geographic areas. The Anglo-Saxon group is represented by 
                                                          
3  In literature “typology” is frequently defined as a set of conceptually derived configurations. They may be 
ideals that do not exist empirically and any attempt to validate them empirically is thus dubious (Doty & 
Glick, 1994). Whitley conceive societal types as “reference points against which empirical economies can be 
compared and deviations explored” (Whitley, 2006, p. 1163). Hence, he understands types as idealized de-
scriptions of societies. Henceforth we will use the term “type” when we refer to the idealized descriptions 
and the terms “cluster” or “group” when we refer to the empirical phenomena. 
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type 1 and the Central European group is represented by type 2. The Northern European group 
is represented by type 3 (Hotho, 2014). 
 
The Anglo-Saxon group is claimed to be relatively capital-market oriented and firms tend to be 
isolated from other economic actors and from the state. Market regulation and dependence on 
the state are low, and training systems (education) and unions are relatively weak. This contrasts 
with the Central European group where firms tend to be embedded in reciprocal relationships 
with banks, other firms or with sector-specific associations. Markets tend to be more regulated, 
business depends on the state to a higher extent, and education systems and unions are stronger. 
According to Hotho (2014), the Northern European group combines strong unions and educa-
tion systems with liberal features such as low business dependence on the state and minor reli-
ance on market regulations. 
 
Not all types of MCSs are appropriate in all societies (Whitley, 1999a). Hence, a certain type 
of MCS may be appropriate for one sort of organization that can be found in a particular society 
but the same MCS is of less value for organizations in other societies. From a contingency 
theory perspective it can be argued that society represents a contingency factor and that a firm’s 
effectiveness is contingent on how well attributes of its MCS fit with societal institutions. Be-
cause institutional factors do not vary on an organizational level, society can explain variations 
among MCS types only on a societal level. This contrasts with most contingency factors that 
have been proposed in the accounting literature and where effects have typically been studied 
at the organizational or sub-unit level (Chenhall, 2003; Luft & Shields, 2003).  
 
The concept of fit plays a central role in the contingency framework. Theory asserts that in any 
given situation a certain organizational structure will be optimal, i.e. firms with a particular 
structure will outperform firms with other structures. Hence, effectiveness is explained by the 
fit between a specific situation and a firm’s structure. It must be stressed that contingency theory 
makes assumptions only about contextually determined optimal structures; it says nothing about 
whether firms actually make rational choices or align their structures optimally (Grabner & 
Moers, 2013). Hence, it is an open question whether firms actually adapt their structures to 
specific contexts or whether the optimal structures are more or less randomly distributed among 
firms. The answer to that question leads to two distinct forms of fit—the congruence form and 
the contingency form (Gerdin & Greve, 2004). With reference to the congruence form of fit, 
firms are generally assumed to adapt structure to context to survive. We should therefore expect 
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covariation between context and structure (Drazin & Van der Ven, 1985; Donaldson, 2001). 
The economic rationale (explanation) underlying such adaptation processes is that the benefits 
and costs of MCSs differ with institutional arrangements (Whitley, 1999a; Williamson, 1985, 
1998). For various reasons firms may nevertheless maintain controls that do not fit with society. 
Ignorance of optimal structures may for example be due to time lags, management fashion, or 
bounded rationality (Abrahamson, 1991; Donaldson, 2001; Johansson, 2015). When no specific 
type of MCS is clearly dominant in a society, there is little or no opportunity to detect fit by 
correlating a society with an MCS. Such diversity of MCSs in every society offers, however, 
another way to model and detect fit. It is now possible to examine whether different types of 
MCSs differ in effectiveness in different societies. The two forms of fit are both expressions of 
the same underlying theory (i.e. fit causes effectiveness) but the causal relationships are differ-
ent (Figure 1). 
 
 
   Figure 1 about here 
 
 
Under the congruence form of fit, the optimal MCS should depend on societal institutions, in 
which case effectiveness is not explicitly recognized in the model (although it explains the cor-
relation between society and an MCS theoretically). In a contingency theory model, an optimal 
MCS in conjunction with a given society increases effectiveness and this effect is explicitly 
modelled. These forms of fit rely on distinct assumptions about organizational behaviour and it 
is unlikely that both forms of fit would be discovered in the same empirical setting. They can 
instead be understood as each other’s mirror images—when one form of fit prevails, the other 
form of fit is rarer (Grabner & Moers, 2013). They overlap only when 1) most firms in a given 
society have adapted their MCSs to societal institutions (the congruence form of fit) but 2) a 
“sufficiently” large group have not adapted their MCSs to society (Luft & Shields, 2003).  
 
What assumptions should be made about the form of fit in a given societal or socio-cultural 
setting? From an economic point of view we should expect that firms tend to choose the MCS 
that is optimal in a certain societal context. If it takes a relatively long time to respond to envi-
ronmental changes the relationship between context and MCS should be weaker (Donaldson, 
2001, Luft & Shields, 2003), but since most societal institutions evolve relatively slowly over 
time it seems likely that firms in general have adequate time to adapt their MCSs to society. In 
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this case the congruence form of fit is more likely to apply, as suggested by Whitley (1999a). 
Yet, the congruence form of fit presumes that decision-makers know what an optimal MCS 
looks like and that they have no incentives to ignore this knowledge (Grabner & Moers, 2013). 
Moreover, from a neo-institutional perspective it has been argued that decisions about MCS 
adoption are driven by isomorphism rather than by economic rationality when decision-makers 
feel uncertainty about economic consequences (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Under such cir-
cumstances we should instead expect a contingency form of fit to apply. This does not neces-
sarily conflict with Whitley’s (1999a) central ideas about optimal MCSs in particular societies 
although it questions his expectations regarding adaptive behaviour. Because theorizing the role 
of societal institutions for MCS effectiveness is novel, and extensive empirical descriptions 
about how firms experiment with and adapt their MCSs to institutional contexts are lacking in 
the literature, we cannot decide a priori what structural form of contingency fit is the most 
appropriate. Instead we deduce and pose hypotheses about both the congruence and contin-
gency forms of fit. 
 
2.2 A typology of MCS 
Whitley (1999a) argues that four attributes of MCSs differ considerably across institutional 
contexts. The first dimension of control—formalism—is understood in terms of quantified, of-
ten financial, measures and indicators as well as extensive reliance on codified procedures and 
rules for monitoring and evaluating performance. The second dimension of control involves the 
extent to which individual group or organizational unit behavior is prescribed and controlled 
by superiors—either formally (e.g. by rules and standards) or informally (by personal supervi-
sion). The third dimension reflects the degree of subordinates’ involvement in processes of 
control, e.g. target-setting, monitoring, or evaluating performance. Finally, the fourth dimen-
sion involves the scope and immediacy of feedback in the control system. Whitley exemplifies 
this last dimension by comparing the scope of control in stereotypical US and Japanese firms, 
where the former tend to allocate rewards based on short-term and narrowly defined indicators 
while the latter take a wider range of aspects of performance into account and also extend the 
evaluation period over several years. 
 
These dimensions of control are conceptually distinct but not mutually exclusive. For example, 
extensive use of formal rules may be combined with intensive activity control (as would be the 
case in a highly bureaucratic organization), but it may also be applied in firms where decisions 
about work processes have been delegated to subordinates who are being controlled by financial 
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results. Likewise, intensive activity control does not necessarily imply a high degree of formal-
ity—it may also be practiced in organizations with low degrees of formality, as in small owner-
controlled firms (using personnel supervision). Whitley suggests that these four dimensions can 
be combined to constitute four distinct types of MCSs, of which three are portrayed in Table 2 
below:4 bureaucratic control, output control, and delegated control. 
 
   Table 2 about here 
 
 
Bureaucratic control combines formal rules and procedures with a high degree of activity con-
trol, low influence of subordinates, and a narrow scope. Output control parallels bureaucratic 
control with one critical exception—activity control is much weaker, which means that control 
of activities has been replaced by control of (financial) output. In delegated control the degree 
of formality varies with firm size (where larger firms apply more formal rules) and subordi-
nates’ influence in these control systems is relatively high when compared with other types. 
Scope is also high in delegated systems. 
 
The bureaucratic type of control is well known in the contingency literature (e.g. Ouchi, 1979, 
1980) although the terminology varies somewhat (bureaucracy based control: Van der Meer-
Koistra & Vosselman, 2000; rules control: Lebas & Weigenstein, 1986; machine con-
trol/boundary control: Speklé, 2001). Likewise, output control has been frequently applied in 
the contingency literature (Abernethy & Brownell, 1997; Eisenhardt, 1985; Govindarajan & 
Fisher, 1990; Ouchi, 1977; Rockness & Shield, 1984; Snell, 1992), although in some typologies 
it has been termed ‘results control’ (e.g. Emmanuel et al., 1996; Merchant & Van der Stede, 
2013) or ‘market control’ (Lebas & Weigenstein, 1986; Ouchi, 1979, 1980; Speklé, 2001). 
Generally, bureaucratic control and output control have been defined as highly formalized control sys-
tems with high and low degrees of activity control, respectively. So far, the two types of control 
                                                          
4  The fourth type in Whitley’s (1999a) typology is denoted as patriarchal control. Since this type of control is 
not claimed to appear in any of the societies being investigated in the present study we do not review patri-
archal control. 
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conform to the types suggested by Whitley. When it comes to subordinates’ influence and or-
ganizational scope, the contingency literature offers a more complex picture (compared with 
Whitley (1999), where influence and scope generally are claimed to be low).  
 
Influence and scope in bureaucratic control has been discussed from various viewpoints. Mer-
chant and Van der Stede (2013) note that action control can be either tight or loose and they list 
various forms of “soft” action controls such as behavioural constraints (i.e. physical or admin-
istrative barriers) and accountability (communicating with and holding subordinates responsi-
ble for their actions). Speklé (2001) distinguishes between two types of hierarchical control: 
machine control (action control through predefined actions) and hierarchical boundary control 
(stipulation of unacceptable actions). While machine control resembles Whitley’s conception 
of bureaucratic control, boundary control represents a bureaucratic type of control wherein sub-
ordinates have considerable influence on the formulation of tasks and the evaluation of out-
comes (ibid, p. 435). Adler & Borys (1996) distinguish between coercive and enabling formal-
ization in bureaucratic control. Coercive formalization is top-down oriented, rules are used to 
limit the initiatives of employees, and deviations from standards are generally regarded with 
suspicion. This opposes enabling formalization, where rules aim to help employees complete 
their tasks, and where dialogues between superiors and subordinates are welcomed to improve 
the transformation process. 
 
Similarly, business control has regularly been discussed from a delegation perspective. Subor-
dinates’ ability to influence a control system has been a central topic in the RAPM literature 
(Hartmann, 2000), the budget participation literature (Shields & Shields, 1998), and the “tight 
budgeting” literature (e.g. Van der Stede, 2001). For example, while tight budget control 
stresses budget goals and shows little tolerance of budget deviations or revisions, a budget sys-
tem characterized by loose control represents a more relaxed form of output control. In such a 
system subordinates may influence budget objectives, changes in budget conditions are coun-
tered with budget revisions, and a negative deviance from a budget is not necessarily perceived 
as an indication of poor performance (Anthony & Govindarajan, 1995). 
 
In summary—while Whitley (1999) contrasts delegated control with the two top-down-oriented 
types, bureaucratic control and output control, it is recognized in the contingency literature that 
delegation may be effectively combined with bureaucratic or output control. The two stand-
points do not really conflict. The delegated control type in Whitley’s (1995a) typology “grants 
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considerable autonomy to subordinate groups and units over work performances and may also 
involve them in standard setting and monitoring” (ibid p 511), i.e. it resembles the loose form 
of output control. Whitley also admits that bureaucratic control, when practiced, does not con-
strain superiors very strictly by rules and that “the extent of control over the work process is 
much less, with more discretion being granted to subordinates” (ibid p 519). In light of these 
observations, we propose a modified MCS typology that relates to findings in the contingency 
literature where it has been argued that delegated forms of control can be combined effectively 
with bureaucratic or output control (Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 
Two types of control, programmable bureaucratic control and programmable output control, 
are identical with bureaucratic and output control in Whitley’s typology (table 2). Delegated 
bureaucratic control combines high degrees of formalization and activity control (bureaucratic 
control) with a medium degree of influence and broad scope (delegated control). Likewise, in 
delegated output control, high formality and a low level of activity control (output control) are 
combined with medium influence and broad scope (delegated control). This profile is almost 
identical to the profile of delegated control in Whitley’s typology—the two profiles differ only 
on the extent to which they rely on formal rules. In Whitley’s delegated control category, the 
level of formalism is “mixed”, which means less formality in “fairly small and specialized” 
organizations and more formality in large organizations (Whitley, 1999a).  
 
 
2.3 Development of hypotheses 
Whitley (1999a) argues that at least six major features of organizations’ institutional contexts 
(see Table 1) are likely to directly affect the sort of control systems they develop. He also dis-
cusses several other characteristics related to work organization and firm type that are likely to 
influence a firm’s choice of controls. However, and as Whitley suggests, institutional contexts 
directly affect the controls firms develop. This study focuses on the impact of these features of 
institutional contexts. 
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According to Whitley (1999b) and Hotho (2014) all the societies included in this study (see 
Table 1) feature a high level of trust in formal institutions and procedures. Similarly, the reli-
ance on contractual authority relations is strong. The extent to which economic actors feel able 
to rely on formal procedures and institutions in making commitments to business partners and 
ensuring their competence affects their willingness to delegate control to intermediates and rely 
on procedural measures to control behavior (Whitley, 1999a, p. 515–516). As Whitley states 
(p. 509), these socio-cultural factors are often implicitly contrasted with direct personal control 
over work activities and reliance on personal, ad hoc, diffuse, and tacit evaluations of perfor-
mance. Hence, we would expect a high degree of formalization to characterize control systems 
in societies where economic activities and their assessment are governed largely by impersonal 
regulations. Because the societies under examination are characterized by high trust in formal 
institutions and strong reliance on contractual authority relations, we propose that effective 
MCSs in the three societies generally feature a high degree of formalization. We will now uti-
lize Whitley’s framework when we propose how societal institutions (listed in table 1) that 
differ across the three societies influence the effectiveness of controls (listed in table 2). We 
start with the Anglo-Saxon group.     
 
As shown in Table 1, the Anglo-Saxon group features a low degree of dependence on the state 
and weak formal state regulation of markets. Whitley proposes that both factors influence the 
effectiveness of activity control in an MCS. Where business dependence on the state is heavy, 
as in South Korea, which implies high political risk, firms are likely to be highly centralized 
and to exert considerable control over the behavior of subunits. He continues: “Overall, then, 
strong state involvement in the economy and in firms’ strategic choices is likely to encourage 
the use of top-down, prescriptive control systems” (Whitley 1999a, p. 517). This would imply 
that where dependence on the state is light, such as in Anglo-Saxon countries, there is less of a 
need to be prescriptive. Control can be applied at arm’s length and focused on outcomes, unless 
other task- or firm-related characteristics pose other requirements, and the discretion to decide 
on the details of activities can be left to subunits and subordinates. The relatively weak formal 
state regulation of markets in Anglo-Saxon societies adds to this effect. Whitley argues that the 
heavier such regulations are the more we should expect firms to institutionalize formal control 
systems in their own organizations. A little formal state regulation would mean less prescriptive 
use of controls within organizations. Therefore, as a result of a low degree of dependence on 
the state and little formal regulation of markets, we should expect control systems in Anglo-
Saxon countries to have relatively little emphasis on activities. 
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Whitley (1999a, p.517) summarizes the specific features of the labor system in various coun-
tries, which directly impinge on the influence of subordinates in control systems.  Features of 
labor systems are described along two dimensions: a) the overall strength of public training 
systems and the extent of union–employer collaboration in their operation, and b) the collective 
strength of unions and horizontal interest groups—such as professional associations—in gen-
eral. A strong public training system, involving employers and unions collaborating with the 
state, is assumed to produce skills that are highly valued by both employees and employers, 
encouraging firms to trust the competence of their skilled workers. In such societies, managers 
are less likely to exercise tight control over employee behavior and are more willing to give 
employees a role in the operation of the control system. Relatedly, strong unions and horizontal 
interest groups in general will limit the ability of managers to impose tight controls over worker 
behavior and also encourage them to share some degree of influence over standard-setting and 
performance evaluation (p. 518). Whitley refers to Germany as a country with a strong public 
training system. In Anglo-Saxon countries, both public training systems and unions are as-
sumed be weak relative to those in Central or Northern European countries (Table 1). Therefore, 
we should not expect to find strong influence of subordinates on control systems in Anglo-
Saxon countries. 
 
Whitley (1999a, p. 510) argues that the scope and immediacy of feedback and control mecha-
nisms reflect, among other things, more general features of employment systems, labor markets, 
and financial systems. He suggests that the stereotypical US corporation tends to focus on rel-
atively short-term and narrowly specified indicators of performance in making career decisions 
and allocating rewards. This clearly suggests a narrow scope for control systems in Anglo-
Saxon countries. 
 
To summarize, control systems in Anglo-Saxon countries are assumed to be formalized, to 
place relatively low emphasis on activities, to allow only limited influence by subordinates, and 
to be narrow in scope. These features correspond to the ideal type of programmable output 
control. Hence, we predict that the programmable output control type is particularly compatible 
with, or fit for, the Anglo-Saxon institutional setting. We regard Whitley’s and our developed 
typology of MCSs as ideal types rather than empirical taxonomies. As such we are interested 
in a firm’s empirical adherence to, or resemblance with, ideal types of MCSs (Doty, Glick & 
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Huber, 1993; Doty & Glick, 1994). As developed above in this article, we can neither theoret-
ically nor empirically specify exactly how the selection of firms’ MCS choices related to insti-
tutional settings plays out, so instead we propose hypotheses about both domination (congru-
ence) and the performance implications of fit (contingency). Regarding MCS type in the Anglo 
Saxon group, we pose the following hypotheses: 
 
H1congruence: Programmable output control is more dominating in the Anglo-Saxon group 
than in the two other groups. 
or 
 
H1contingency: Programmable output control has a more positive impact on firms’ effective-
ness in the Anglo Saxon group than in the two other groups. 
 
Business dependence on the state and the extent of market regulations are thought to be higher 
in central Europe than in other societal groups (Table 1). This may explain why reliance on 
activity control in MCSs differs between these societies. As discussed above, state dependence 
would seem to imply that firms are relatively highly centralized and exert considerable control 
over the behavior of subunits. While it is not clearly obvious that firms are considerably more 
dependent on the state in the Central Europe group than, say, in the Northern Europe group, 
Whitley suggests other reasons that might induce Central European firms to rely on activity 
controls. When major shareholders and creditors are locked into the fate of individual enter-
prises, as in bank-driven financial markets, they are likely to insist on both formal procedures 
governing major decisions and frequent flows of both formal and informal information to man-
age the greater risks involved (Whitley 1999a, p. 514). This would also mean less discretion 
exercised by top management over strategic choices compared with societies where such a lock-
in effect is less prevalent. More regulation of markets (e.g. elaborate licensing rules, ibid. p. 
514) also drives firms in Central Europe to institutionalize formal control systems in their own 
organizations. It is evident that instituting more such rules requires more controls pertaining to 
boundaries to ensure that units adequately adhere to these norms. Hence, we would expect firms 
in bank-driven and state-regulated Central European countries to rely more heavily on activity 
controls than their counterparts in Anglo-Saxon and Northern European countries. 
 
Whitley also suggests that firm interdependence with investors and managers in bank-driven 
financial markets leads to the development of more elaborate and wide-ranging control systems 
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in most firms, as planning and control can be more long-term oriented and assume a greater 
degree of risk-sharing (p. 515). Hence, we would expect the scope of control systems to be high 
in Central Europe. 
 
As noted above, Whitley (1999a, p. 517) uses Germany as an example of a country where the 
public training system is strong. As Table 1 suggests, unions also exert strong influence on 
labor relations in Central Europe. Following the above argumentation, these features should 
lead to a delegated form of control wherein subordinates have some influence in target-setting 
and performance evaluation. 
 
To summarize, control systems in Central European countries are assumed to be formalized, to 
have relatively strong emphasis on activities, to allow for some influence by subordinates, and 
to be broad in scope. These features correspond with the ideal type of delegated bureaucratic 
control. Therefore we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H2congruence: Delegated bureaucratic control is more dominating in the Central 




H2contingency: Delegated bureaucratic control has a more positive impact on firms’ 
effectiveness in the Central European group than in the two other groups. 
 
Whitley (1999a) does not distinguish between control systems in the Central and Northern Eu-
ropean groups. However, as noted by Hotho (2014), there are some notable differences between 
the two groups. Central European countries are oriented towards bank credits, while Northern 
European countries are more capital-market oriented. The tendency to rely on bank credits ra-
ther than capital markets in Central Europe locks majority-owners and creditors into the fate of 
a business. Because they cannot easily escape from their commitments, they cope with the high 
risks involved by frequently asking for information and insisting on formal procedures for stra-
tegic decision-making. Demands placed on formalism in corporate governance echoes within 
an organization as managers try to control activities at lower levels in a corresponding way 
(Whitley, 1999a). Adopting a capital-market orientation in Northern Europe affects the organ-
ization of activities in a direction that aligns with business systems in Anglo-Saxon economies, 
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as the lock-in effects for owners are reduced. Still, strong unions and strong training systems in 
this group make firms less likely to adopt programmable output systems. There will be a pres-
sure from employees and interest from managers not only to delegate operational decisions but 
also to involve subordinates in control processes, thereby taking full advantage of subordinates’ 
skills and willingness to assume responsibility. This is why we should expect firms in the North-




H3congruence: Delegated output control is more dominating in the Northern European 




H3contingency: Delegated output control has a more positive impact on firms’ effectiveness 
in the Northern European group than in the two other groups. 
 
 
Programmable bureaucratic control is not expected to dominate or outperform other types of 
control in any of the three societies being investigated and therefore we will not, hereafter, pay 
attention to this type of control. The omission of programmable bureaucratic control is in ac-
cordance with Whitley (1995a), as he argues that bureaucratic control may be effective in con-




3. Research method 
This study is part of a larger international research project focusing on MCS packages. Re-
searchers from nine European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Norway, Poland, and Sweden), Australia, and Canada participate in the project. The research 
project consists of several subprojects and the study reported in this paper is one of these sub-
projects. Data were collected through a structured questionnaire and all participating countries 
used the same questionnaire (Schaffer & Riordan, 2003). The questionnaire was based on the 
framework of Malmi and Brown (2008) and was organized around seven sections: strategic 
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planning, short-term planning, performance measurement, incentive system, organizational 
structure and culture, organizational characteristics, and organizational environment. However, 
questions of relevance to this study constituted only a minor part of the questionnaire.  
 
Our research focuses on strategic business units (SBU) and the intended respondents are CEOs 
and managing directors (see Table 4 for numbers and positions of respondents). We defined an 
SBU as an entity that faces a unique competitive situation (in relation to other corporate units) 
and can be regarded as having its own competitive strategy. Strategy formulation and imple-
mentation can differ at the firm and SBU levels (Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985), especially in 
companies with diverse product portfolios. Yet, SBUs within a given company may face 
marked, specific competitive and contextual factors, so studying SBUs can yield a more homo-
geneous picture of management control practices than studying practices at the firm level (Kruis 
et al., 2016). Consequently, we focus on the SBU level to include the effects that varying con-
texts within SBUs have on SBUs top managers’ use of MSCs to affect employee behaviour. 
 
To ensure the reliability of the measurement instruments, regular meetings were arranged for 
project members to address research design, methodology, and method. A detailed survey man-
ual (providing construct clarification) was developed that explains and underpins the questions 
in the questionnaire and coding procedures were applied uniformly. Checks on data consistency 
and missing values were conducted at the local team level. 
 
Even though this project was carried out using a survey, the data were collected via personal 
interviews with one or more members of the top management teams of each SBU. Researchers, 
doctoral students, and master’s students conducted the interviews. Researchers and doctoral 
students are members of the core team but the master’s students were not. To ensure that they 
were prepared to conduct the interviews, researchers in the core team educated them, and they 
had access to a detailed survey manual and a contact person (i.e. one of the researchers on the 
core team). The time used for an interview was typically between 1.5 and 3 hours. Most re-
sponses were given on a 7-graded Likert scale and the remaining responses were chosen from 
a list of categories (e.g. ownership type). 
 
The ORBIS database was used to select companies from the nine European countries, the Dun 
and Bradstreet database was used for Australia, and Scott’s National database was used for 
Canada. The ORBIS database contains information on over 200 million companies worldwide and 
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more than 93 million companies are situated in Europe. It includes information about geographical re-
gion, financials and financial strength indicators, industry, size, stock data, identifiers, etc. The 
same four factors were used to select the populations from all three databases (Boolean search);  
- Status (active) 
- Legal forms (private, for-profit companies)  
- World region (i.e. country) 
- Company size (company size>250 employees).  
The lists were then checked manually to avoid duplication and identify companies that were 
closed or sold, all of which were deleted. From this quality-controlled total list, a random sam-
ple was selected (either by random numbers or by selection of ‘every third firm’; Cochran, 
1977). For each country the sample displays the same distribution for the manufacturing, trade, 
and services sectors, respectively, as in the total list per country. Finally, from each company 
an SBU (with 50 or more employees) was selected for questioning (for some companies the 
SBU coincides with the company). The current study includes nine countries (Italy and Poland 
do not belong to any of the three institutional groups being examined and were excluded) and 
the total sample amounts to 694 SBUs, of which 610 were considered usable (Table 4). The 
sizeable loss of answers was due mainly to insufficient information about capital (assets) or 
operating profits (effectiveness (see section 3.2) is measured as the average ROA for two years). 
For some SBUs it was not possible to obtain formal economic reports on capital or operating 
profits, while some SBUs submitted incomplete reports.  
 
 
   Table 4 about here 
 
3.2 Variable measurements 
3.2.1 Dependent variable: Effectiveness  
ROA, based on reported operating profits and reported assets for the two previous years, were 
calculated and the mean value was assessed. Eleven SBUs reported profits and assets for only 
one year—usually because the unit did not exist in the other year (due to a merger, bankruptcy, 
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3.2.2 Independent variables 
3.2.2.1 MCS 
The four variables listed by Whitley (1999a) (formalization, activity control, influence, and 
scope) are used as conceptualizations of MCSs.  
 
Formalization is taken from Whitley (1999a), and is understood as extensive reliance on codi-
fied rules and procedures and the application of quantified—often financial—indicators when 
managers control economic activities. Many firms rely on budgets and the associated codified 
rules and procedures for formal planning, coordination, and monitoring of economic activities 
to ensure the achievement of predictable goals. Simons (1995) characterized this type of budget 
control as the diagnostic use of budgets, and in the present study we operationalize formaliza-
tion as the extent to which firms use budgets for diagnostic control. We have replaced budgets 
with the performance measurement system (PMS) for those SBUs (11 cases) that do not use 
budgets at all. The construct is based on Simons (1995) and Henri (2006) and contains three 
questions pertaining to the extent to which managers use budgets (or PMSs) for (1) identifica-
tion of critical performance variables, (2) targeting critical performance variables, and (3) mon-
itoring progress and correcting deviations from preset performance targets (measured with 7-
graded Likert scales). The questions (related to all variables) are presented in Appendix 1.  
 
Activity control denotes the extent to which “individual group and organizational unit behavior 
is tightly prescribed and controlled” (Whitley, 1999a, p 510). In the present study all types of 
MCSs are characterized by highly formalized control systems and we assume that when activity 
control is practiced in such organizations it tends to be formalized as well. Formalized activity 
control can take the form of standardization of procedures as in scientific management (Whit-
ley, 1999a) or machine control (Speklé, 2001), but activity control can also imply the specifi-
cation of unacceptable behavior or the stipulation of boundaries (Merchant & Van der Stede, 
2013; Simons, 1995; Speklé, 2001). Standardization of procedures is not considered an option 
for any of the three types being examined in the present study (it relates to programmable bu-
reaucratic control, which was excluded from the typology) and thus we delimit activity control 
to the stipulation of boundaries. Activity control is measured by questions that refer to prior 
studies that examine the extent of boundaries (Simons, 2005; Widener, 2007). The instrument 
contained the following eight questions: To what extent does top management (1) use codes of 
conduct, (2) review plans before action, (3) employ written authorization levels and decision 
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rules, (4) sanction known unethical business conduct by subordinates, (5) employ written guide-
lines that direct or limit opportunity search, (6) communicate risks and activities to be avoided, 
(7) apply sanctions to subordinates who engage in risks outside organizational policy, and (8) 
specify minimum requirements for business opportunities (measured with 7-graded Likert 
scales)? Three items (questions number 2, 5, and 8) were dropped from the final measure of 
constructs since loadings were below 0.5 in a factor analysis that was performed.  
Influence denotes the extent of subunit involvement in target-setting and in monitoring or eval-
uating performance (Whitley 1999a, p 510). We based our questions on Bogsnes (2009) when 
measuring how short-term targets are set regarding (1) ends (goals and objectives), and (2) 
means (ways to achieve the ends) in the focal SBU. Answers range from “Top management 
sets targets and passes them to subordinates” to “Subordinates set targets autonomously with 
little, if any, management involvement”. Only five alternatives were available. In the final 
measure of constructs the scale was still 5-graded but the interval was transformed to 1–7.  
Scope denotes long-sightedness in performance evaluation. Broad control systems take several 
aspects of work performance into account when evaluating performance and they do not give 
priority to short-term quantitative predefined targets. We use three statements (based on 
Bogsnes (2009) and Simons (2005)) when we measure broadness: SBU management evaluates 
subordinates’ performance by (1) achievements in leadership behavior, (2) actions and activi-
ties taken, and (3) individual effort, and we use 7-graded Likert scales. 
 
An explorative factor analysis (Principal Axis Factoring, Varimax rotation) was undertaken. 
After excluding three items with low loadings (all related to activity control) all items showed 
loadings above 0.5 and four factors show Eigenvalues above 1.0. A confirmative factor analysis 
using AMOS was conducted on this final model for the control of attributes. The measurement 
model of the control attributes modeled as four latent (reflective) variables produces acceptable 
fit to the data for a large sample (Hair et al., 2010) and all indicators load above 0.5 on their 
respective factors. The results of the confirmative factor analysis are presented in Appendix 2. 
Indexes for each variable were calculated as mean values of indicators. 
 
3.2.2.2 Institutional context 
The variable institutional context is based on Whitley (1999b) and Hotho (2014). It is a cate-
gorical variable containing three institutional contexts: Anglo-Saxon, Central Europe, and 
Northern Europe. The Anglo-Saxon and Central European contexts were theoretically derived 
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and they were originally termed compartmentalized and collaborative systems, respectively 
(Whitley, 1999b). The Northern European context was empirically derived by Hotho (2014).  
 
The typology of societies has been empirically tested by Hotho (2014) in a cluster analysis. He 
conducted two analyses—one with data from 2000 and a second with data from 2011. Overall 
the clusters remain stable over time, i.e. clusters with similar properties are found in both anal-
yses and the grouping of countries is approximately the same. The reported clusters from these 
analyses enable us to assign individual countries to the three institutional contexts. Conse-
quently, we refer to these results when sorting the nine countries in our sample in three catego-
ries: 
 
Anglo-Saxon group: Australia and Canada 
Central European group: Austria, Belgium, and Germany 
Northern European group: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden 
 
The analysis is carried out separately for each society where the focal society is denoted as a 
dummy variable (value=1) and the rest of the sample represents the reference group (value = 
0).     
 
3.2.3   Control variables 
Many have suggested that societal institutions in concert with other contextual factors affect 
MCSs. Indeed, institutions might affect MCSs directly, but they may also affect the environ-
ment in which they operate and thus exert an indirect effect on MCSs. In this study we control 
for four environmental factors that are well known from the contingency literature (e.g. Gordon 
& Miller, 1976, Khandwalla, 1977, Mintzberg, 1983, Chenhall, 2003) and also for industry 
grouping of SBUs. For environmental factors we used seven-graded Likert scales. Imputation 
was used when data were missing (28 occurrences). For industry grouping we use dummies.  
 
Environmental dynamism. A dynamic environment is, as opposed to a stable environment, char-
acterized by rapid changes. Our measure of dynamism is based on Miller & Friesen (1983). 
Respondents indicated the magnitude of changes they have experienced in the last three years 
in each of six listed areas that have had a material impact on their business. The six areas are 
customers, suppliers, competitors, technology, regulations, and the economy.  
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Environmental unpredictability. This measure is adapted from Govindarajan (1984). Respond-
ents rate six environmental areas (as above) on a scale from very predictable to very unpredict-
able. 
 
Environmental heterogeneity refers to environmental complexity and the measure is based on 
Miller & Friesen (1983). It is the mean value of the diversity of 1) customer product/service 
requirements and 2) competitors’ strategies and tactics.   
 
Environmental Hostility has frequently been understood as in terms of the intensity of compe-
tition (Chenhall, 2003) although regulatory restrictions and labour or material shortages may 
also represent a serious threat (Miller & Friesen, 1983). In this paper environmental hostility is 
the mean value of 1) perceived intensity of competition for main products/services and 2) per-
ceived difficulty in obtaining necessary inputs.  
 
The study also controls for the industry grouping of the SBUs. This variable is included to 
control for that differences in MCS effectiveness is not just industry effects. Industry grouping 
refers to manufacturing, services, and trade/wholesale. Dummies are used with manufacturing 
as reference.   
  
3.3 Data analysis 
We rely on Whitley’s typology when testing the hypotheses and we adopt a configurative per-
spective. The three MCS types are clearly regarded as control systems and a system approach 
is thus appropriate for hypothesis tests (Drazin & Van der Ven, 1985). As a first step the three 
ideal types (see Table 4) were translated into quantifiable ideal profiles (Table 5).    
 
   Table 5 about here 
 
A seven-graded scale was used where “low” was denoted by 1, “limited” by 2,”medium” by 4, 
“considerable” by 6 and “high” by 7. The dimension “Influence” in Whitley’s typology ranges 
only between “low” and “medium” while the three other dimensions range between “low” and 
“high”. It was not obvious how to interpret this divergence. Is medium the maximum level of 
influence (i.e. higher levels cannot be reached) or is medium the optimal level and higher levels 
might harm effectiveness? We decided to translate medium with 4, thereby suggesting that 
higher values (i.e. 6–7) reduce effectiveness.  
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In a second step the distances between optimal and actual profiles for each case were computed 
(expressed in terms of Euclidian distance). For example, the Euclidian distance (ED) between 
one case (i) and the programmable output control type was assessed in the following way: 
 
𝐸𝐷𝑖 = √(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖 − 7)
2 + (𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 − 1)
2 + (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 − 2)
2 + (𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖 − 1)
2 
 
This operation was carried out for each type, meaning that for each case the distance to each of 
the three types of MCS was calculated. To facilitate the interpretation of results the scales were 
then reversed, i.e. a high value on the MCS variable indicates proximity to the ideal type of that 
MCS. 
 
Hypothesized associations were examined by OLS regressions and in a third step models were 
assessed to complete tests of hypotheses 1–3. The following regression model was assessed to 
test congruence hypotheses: 
 
𝑀𝐶𝑆𝑖 = 𝑎 +  𝑏1𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗 +  𝑏2−6(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) 
 
MCS represents proximity to one ideal MCS (i) and society (expressed as a dummy with the 
value 1) represents one society (j). The model controls for firm-specific features, although we 
are only interested in the variety at the societal level. The regression was run three times—each 
time with an MCS and a society that are hypostatized to fit with each other.      
 
The contingency hypotheses were tested with moderated regression analysis (Hartmann & 
Moers, 1999) with ROA as the dependent variable and MCS and Society as independent (and 
interacting) variables:  
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎 +  𝑏1𝑀𝐶𝑆𝑖 + 𝑏2 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝑏3𝑀𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝑏4−8 (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) 
 
According to theory, a particular MCS with certain features has a more positive impact on ef-
fectiveness in one society than in others. Thus we should expect a positive interaction effect 
(b3) on ROA when an MCS fits with a society. This represents a cross-level model with a top-
down interaction (Luft & Shields, 2003, p. 198)   





Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample. Variables 2–4 represent the three forms 
of MCSs and the value measures proximity to the type of MCS, respectively. Variables 5–7 
represent societies. They are represented by dummies and are internally dependent (analyti-
cally).  
 
           Table 6 about here 
 
We tested the congruence form of fit by regressing societies with MCSs. We then tested the 
contingency form of fit by assessing the effect on ROA of interaction between societies and 
MCSs. The results from the six regressions are presented in Table 7.  
 
            Table 7 about here 
It has been suggested that programmable output dominates in Anglo-Saxon societies (H1). Re-
sults in Table 7 indicate a significant negative association between society and programmable 
output (-0,159), suggesting that programmable output control is relatively uncommon in Anglo-
Saxon societies (when compared with Central and Northern European societies). Hypothesis 
H1Congruence is thus rejected. However, the results also indicate that programmable output control 
has a significantly more positive influence on effectiveness in Anglo-Saxon society when com-
pared with the two other societies. The interaction effect is positive and significant (+0,508) 
and hypothesis H1Contingency thus gets support.  
Hypothesis H2 states that delegated bureaucratic control fits with Central European society, but 
the results presented in table 7 do not confirm this idea. A positive relationship is reported 
between society and delegated bureaucratic control (+ 0.020) but it is insignificant and hypoth-
esis H2Congruence, which pertains to the congruence form of fit, is thus rejected. The hypothesis 
that pertains to the contingency form of fit (H2Contingency) is also rejected since the interaction 
effect is negative (-0.130). 
Delegated output control is suggested to fit with institutions in Northern Europe (H3). The con-
gruence form of fit does not seem to be apparent—the coefficient is negative (-0.026). Since 
H3Congruence receives no support we reject that hypothesis. However, an interactive form of fit is 
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observed. The interaction coefficient between society and delegated output control is positive 
(+ 0.431) and statistically significant, confirming H3Contingency. 
Overall, the congruence form of fit receives no support in any of the three societies. The con-
tingency form of fit finds support in two out of the three societies. Only for Central Europe do 
we observe no form of fit with MCSs. From a contingency perspective the opposite findings 
regarding the congruence and contingency forms of fit in Anglo-Saxon and the Northern Euro-
pean societies should be no surprise. If institutional differences across societies are moderate, 
organizational adaptation may not differ radically between societies even though some organi-
zational structures and controls may be more advantageous in one society than in others.  
Recall that all the hypotheses are formulated in relative terms. The congruence hypotheses are 
tested by comparing the closeness to an ideal MCS between societies. For example, the results 
of the test of H1Congruence indicate that Anglo-Saxon firms in general are more distant from the 
programmable output control type than are firms in the two other societies. This result does not 
suggest that programmable output control is discarded by Anglo Saxon firms; it suggests only 
that this sort of MCS is even more popular among firms in other societies. To capture the use 
of MCSs we assess the mean value of closeness (i.e. reversed distances) to each ideal MCS in 




   Table 8 about here 
 
A high value indicates closeness to an ideal MCS. The same MCS leads in all three groups, 
namely the delegated bureaucratic control system. Only in Central European society is this con-
trol system expected to dominate. The results presented in Table 8 provide information pertain-
ing to how firms in the three societies position themselves regarding MCSs but they do not alter 
our previous conclusions about adaptation—the congruence form of fit receives very little sup-
port in this study. 
How sensitive are the results to the assumptions made when the modified typology was quan-
tified? Recall that the dimension of influence (of subordinates) in the delegated control system 
in Whitley (1999a) is set to “medium”, but since no other group is rated higher on this item 
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“medium” may as well be considered the maximum rate. In this study we decided to translate 
“medium” with the number 4 on a 7-graded scale, but how would the results have been affected 
if “medium” for influence were translated to 7? We adjusted the values for influence in dele-
gated bureaucratic control and delegated output control from 4 to 7 and reran the regressions. 
The resulting changes in coefficients were insignificant and the results from the hypothesis tests 




The aim of this study was to investigate whether socio-cultural or societal institutions affect 
how companies design and use MCSs. Our ideas were based largely on Whitley (1999a) and 
Hotho (2014) and framed by the contingency theory view of structural relations between con-
texts, MCSs, and effectiveness (Chenhall, 2003; Gerdin & Greve, 2004). Specifically, the idea 
was to investigate whether certain types of MCSs dominate in certain societies (socio-cultural 
contexts) and whether the effectiveness of a given type of MCS varies depending on the socio-
cultural setting—the society—in which it operates 
Business systems with unique characteristics evolve differently in distinct societies and when 
managers develop MCSs they are likely to adapt these systems to the business context in the 
societal context in which they operate. On this basis, Whitley (1999a) proposes that (program-
mable) output control dominates in the Anglo-Saxon group and that forms of delegated control 
dominate in the Central European and Northern European groups. The findings of this study, 
however, provide limited support for these propositions. We find that delegated forms of control 
prevail in the Central European and Northern European group, and that this also is the case for 
the Anglo-Saxon group. Our study suggests that there exists a subdivision of delegated control 
into delegated bureaucratic control and delegated output control. We hypothesize that the for-
mer type of delegated control should prevail in the Central European group and the latter type 
in the Northern European group. Our findings suggest that delegated bureaucratic control dom-
inates in both the Central European and Northern European groups (and in the Anglo-Saxon 
group). In fact, the ranking of the three control systems is identical in the three institutional 
groups: delegated bureaucratic control ranks first, followed by delegated output control, and 
programmable output control. Thus, our study provides little support for the idea that certain 
types of MCS prevail in certain societies. 
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The dominance of delegated bureaucratic control in our study does not necessarily, however, 
imply that this type of control has the most positive impact on organizational effectiveness in 
all institutional groups and as such it does not exclude that potential importance of society–
MCS fit. Following Whitley’s (1999a) arguments, we suggest that the adoption of an MCS that 
is compatible with the institutional context in which it operates has a more positive impact on 
effectiveness in the corresponding society compared with other societies where the MCS is 
incompatible. Because all the types of control included in this study exist in all three institu-
tional groups, the study provides the opportunity to assess the relative effectiveness of the con-
trol systems in each group. Regarding the Anglo-Saxon and Northern European groups, our 
results clearly suggest that there is one control system that fits with an MCS in each society and 
that it is the predicted type of MCS that produces the results (H1 and H3). For the Central 
European group, however, delegated bureaucratic control (H2) has not had more positive ef-
fects on effectiveness than it has had in other societies. 
To conclude, the findings in this study provide limited support for Whitley’s (1999a) suggestion 
that MCSs adapt to the institutional contexts in which they operate. However, the idea that the 
effectiveness of MCSs varies across institutional contexts due to differences in societal institu-
tions and business systems is largely supported (on two out of three societies/hypotheses). We 
find that programmable output control is more effective in the Anglo-Saxon group and that 
delegated output control is more effective in the Northern European group. Refining the types 
of MCSs in Whitley´s (1999a) typology by subdividing delegated control into delegated bu-
reaucratic control and delegated output control proved useful as it provides more highly detailed 
insights and enables us to draw more refined conclusions about MCSs in institutional contexts. 
As such our results lend support to the relevance of Whitley’s societal institutional perspective 
on business systems to the understanding of the design and effectiveness of MCSs in a cross-
societal comparative perspective. To the best of our knowledge, few tests have been performed 
to test the predictive validity of existing typologies. Another addition to the business system 
literature is that we provide further support for Hotho’s (2014) notion that Northern European 
countries mix liberal influences from Anglo-Saxon countries with corporate influences from 
Central Europe into a particular institutional context that bears consequences for MCS effec-
tiveness. 
These results of our study also contributes to two important and somewhat interwoven discus-
sions within management accounting research. First, our findings contribute to the contingency 
theory literature (Chenhall, 2003) by adding a novel contingency factor that is important for 
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explaining the appropriateness of certain types of MCS depending on context. Apart from con-
tingencies at the firm level, we show that society is a factor that determines the appropriateness 
of MCS design. To the best of our knowledge this is one of the first large-scale studies to pro-
vide evidence of such an effect. Our approach to detecting the importance of society–MCS fit 
has been to interact three types of MCS with society—while controlling for firm-specific con-
tingencies—to assess the importance of society–MCS fit. Future research efforts could, how-
ever, be directed at developing theoretical and empirical approaches to assess potential interac-
tions between society, firm-specific contingencies, and MCSs. Such an approach would imply 
theorizing cross-level interactions (Luft & Shields, 2003) and using multi-level statistical mod-
eling.  
Concerning the forms of fit deduced from Whitley’s framework and contingency theory, our 
study suggests that the adaptation process results not in congruence but in a contingent expla-
nation (Gerdin & Greve, 2004). Certain MCSs do not dominate in certain societies, but their 
effectiveness differs. As developed above it is natural to find support for the contingency form 
of fit, where the congruence form of fit is not present (or vice versa), if the underlying theory 
of fit is valid. So, in that sense the rejection of the hypotheses based on the congruence form of 
fit does not imply a weakening of the general theory of fit, which is the subject matter of con-
tingency theory (Donaldson, 2001). Rather, it indicates that the societies under investigation 
share components (overlap) that make it possible for multiple MCS designs to be in use, but at 
same time the societies are distinctly different in a way that makes certain MCS designs more 
appropriate. Considering that the societies that have been available for analysis for this research 
are all located in the Western world and therefore to some extent share a business system insti-
tutional origin, perhaps comparisons with other and more dissimilar societies (Asia and Africa) 
would also lend support to the idea that certain MCSs dominate in certain societies. 
Second, our study contributes to the literature discussing the notion of a global convergence of 
MCS practices (Brandau et al., 2013; Lukka & Granlund, 1998; Van der Stede, 2003). Due to 
isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) stemming from e.g. intracorporate struc-
tures, professionalization and mimicry, and rationalized myths (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) about 
MCS practices, certain practices spread and stick (Colyvas & Jonsson, 2011) in organizational 
fields, and hence local variants (adaptations) of practices tend to disappear over time. Our re-
sults suggest that such processes are influencing the adoption and design of MCS practices in 
our cross-society sample since we find little support for the notion of the popular domination 
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of certain MCSs in certain societies. A theoretical explanation for such a finding is most prob-
ably related to the convergence of MCSs across societies. Importantly, we contribute to this 
line of research by showing that, while MCS convergence is most likely at stake here, the con-
vergence, or homogenization, at the wider business system level (the institutional arrangement) 
has not been exhaustive and as such the appropriateness of certain types of MCSs remains 
bound to local settings. While the MCS types investigated here all have a similar spread, certain 
MCSs are more appropriate in certain societies, which is explained by the separately evolved 
business systems in these societies. In that sense it could be argued that institutional theory of 
convergence and the contingency theory of society–MCS fit complement each other.  
This study has several implications for the contingency framework. First, society represents a 
contextual factor that influences the effectiveness of MCS. This is important when we compare 
particular designs of MCSs across societies to judge which are most effective. Prior inter-soci-
etal studies have typically explained observed differences by reference to national culture (e.g. 
Harrison, 1992; Merchant et. al., 1995) but the results have been mixed (Chenhall, 2003). The 
addition of institutional factors may produce more robust results in such studies. Second, soci-
ety represents a contextual factor at a higher system level than has usually been applied in con-
tingency studies. This should have implications for our interpretation of reported findings in 
contingency studies. Societal factors may have direct effects on the effectiveness of an MCS 
(as demonstrated in the present study) or they may have indirect effects (when they influence 
how contingencies on an organizational level affect the effectiveness of an MCS). In both cases 
the observed effects of MCSs are circumscribed by the societal context in which the study has 
taken place. Historically, many contingency studies have been carried out in Anglo-Saxon 
countries and the contemporary contingency framework may thus be biased towards this soci-
etal type. One practical implication should also be mentioned. When firms expand and go 
abroad they should remember that the effectiveness of an MCS depends on institutional factors 
in the society where the MCS is deployed. Therefore, it may be more profitable to develop 
control systems that fit with local institutions than to export the same MCS to all foreign units.  
Our study is not without limitations. Although we used an interview-based survey approach our 
data collection method still potentially suffers from the general weakness of using subjective 
ratings from one respondent as information pertaining to an entire organization (SBU). The 
Anglo-Saxon group of countries in this study was represented only by Australia and Canada. 
This might limit the reliability of our results. Therefore, future studies could replicate (or ex-
tend) our study with a greater number of Anglo-Saxon countries. Furthermore, the typology of 
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institutional contexts used in this study comprises institutional groups that are quite similar in 
characteristics, particularly in their high trust in formal institutions and reliance on contract-
based relations of authority. Future research could therefore examine relationships between in-
stitutional contexts and MCSs using an extended typology which includes institutional groups 
that differ even more widely on these (and other) characteristics. Clustering countries in rather 
crisp types of societies (Hotho, 2014) may hide interesting nuances that could either strengthen 
or weaken the results found here. Factoring fuzzier nuances of difference between regions in 
different countries and across societies might also be interesting. 
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Appendix 1. Questionnaire items 
Formality (7-graded scales) 
To what extent do members of the SBU’s top management team use budgets and/or performance measures for the 
following: 
a) Identify critical performance variables (i.e. factors indicating progress towards strategic objectives) 
b) Set targets for critical performance variables 
c) Monitor progress towards and correct deviations from preset performance targets. 
 
Activity control (7-graded scales) 
In trying to guide and control your subordinate’s behavior, how extensively do you. . . 
a) Use company-wide codes of conduct or similar statements? 
b) Segregate duties and review plans before actions? 
c) Employ written authorization levels and decision rules? 
d) Make sanctions of unethical businesses known to subordinates (e.g. by written statements)? 
e) Employ written guidelines that stipulate specific areas for, or limits on, opportunity search and experimenta-
tion? 
f) Actively communicate in writing the risks and activities to be avoided by subordinates? 




Please indicate, by checking one box in each column, which alternative best describes short-term target setting. 
 
  ENDS 
 
MEANS 
1.    Top management sets targets and passes    
 
  
        them to subordinates    
 
  
2.    Top management sets targets, but revises   
 
  
         them in negotiations with subordinates   
 
  
3.    Targets setting is quite long, iterative negotiation    
 
  
         process between organizational levels   
 
  
4.    Subordinates set autonomously targets, but they    
 
  
         are subject to top management acceptance   
 
  
5.    Subordinates set targets autonomously with little,    
 
  




Scope (7-graded scales) 
Please indicate to what extent you base your subordinates’ performance on 
a) Achievements in leadership behaviour 
b) Actions and activities taken 
c) Individual effort 
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Appendix 2. Statistics of measurement analysis 
Confirmatory factor analysis (maximum likelihood). Factors loadings and latent variable correlations. 
     Correlations     
     Activity Influence Scope   
Formality (CR 0.840)    Loadings 0.245*** -0.127* 0.152**   
Budgets for identification of critical measures 0.778***    
Budget for targeting 0.853***    
 Budgets for monitoring  0.760***    
Activity control (CR 0.759)   -0.034 0.403*** 
Codes of conduct 0.617***    
Authorization levels 0.628***    
Sanctions of unethical conduct 0.527***    
Communicate activities to be avoided 0.677***    
Sanctions for engaging in risks outside policy 0.653***    
Influence (CR 0.649)    -0.031 
How are short-term targets set regarding ends 0.753***    
How are short-term targets set regarding means 0.630***    
Scope (CR 0.704)     
Evaluations of leadership 0.663***    
Evaluations of actions taken 0.673***    
Evaluations of individual effort 0.658***    
 
Model fit: X2 151.904***; Df 60; CFI 0.954; TLI 0.940; RMSEA 0.050 (Pclose 0.473). CR means com-
posite reliability. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. 
 
For the Influence construct we assumed equal weighting of items since a factor structure with 
less than three indicators is under identified in isolation and may produce meaningless weights 
(above 1) even when included in a nomological network. To test for discriminant validity we 
compared models where the correlation between constructs is set to 1 with models that estimates 
them freely (Bagozzi et al., 1991). In all instances the unconstraint models produced a statisti-
cally significant (p<.0.05) lower chi-two value of one degree of freedom difference, showing 
that they discriminate. Also the latent variable correlations indicate that they are only moder-
ately correlated with each other. The highest correlation (r=0.403) is between Activity control 
and Scope. 
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Table 1  
Typology of societies (Sources: Whitley, 1999b; Hotho, 2014) 
 
Institutional factors Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
 
Compartmentalized Collaborative “New” type 
    
Trust in formal institutions High High High 
Authority relations Contract-based Contract-based Contract-based 
Business dependence on the state Low Considerable Low 
Extent of market regulations Low High Low 
Strength of training systems Low High High 
Strength of unions Low to some High High 
    
Socio-cultural Groups Anglo-Saxon Central Europe Northern Europe 
 
Table 2 
Typology of MCSs (Source: Whitley, 1999a, p. 511) 
 
 Bureaucratic Output Delegated 
  control control control 
Reliance on formal rules High High Mixed 
Control of activities High Low Low 
Influence of subordinates Low Limited Medium 
Scope of control systems Limited Low High 
 
Table 3    
A modified typology of MCS  
 Programmable  Programmable  Delegated Delegated 
 bureaucratic output bureaucratic output 
  control control control control 
Reliance on formal rules  High High High High 
Control of activities High Low High Low 
Influence of subordinates Low Limited Medium Medium 





Countries, numbers of SBUs, and titles of interviewees 
     
Country     Number of Percent of 
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     SBUs             SBUs 
Australia 38 6.2 
Austria 36 5.9 
Belgium 43 7.0 
Canada 45 7.4 
Denmark 111 18.2 
Finland 94 15.4 
Germany 78 12.8 
Norway 63 10.3 
Sweden 102 16.7 
Total 610 100.0 
   
Title of interviewee   
CEO 199 32.6 
CFO 247 40.5 
COO 28 4.6 
Other 125 20.5 
N/A 11 1.8 
Total 610 100.0 
 
 
Table 5    
Typology of MCSs on a 1–7 scale 
 
 
Programmable Delegated Delegated 
 
output bureaucratic output 
 
control control control 
Formalization 7 7 7 
Activity control 1 7 1 
Influence 2 4 4 
Scope 1 7 7 
 
  
 42  
 
Table 6  
Descriptive statistics (N=610) 
 
 Mean Min Max Std. Dev. 
ROA 0.080 -0.530 0.890 0.121 
Programmed output 5.975 1.270 10.490 1.316 
Delegated bureaucrat. 7.670 2.140 11.400 1.574 
Delegated output 6.723 2.300 10.080 1.193 
Anglo-Saxon 0.136 0.000 1.000 0.343 
Central Europe 0.257 0.000 1.000 0.438 
Northern Europe 0.607 0.000 1.000 0.489 
Dynamism 3.964 1.000 6.170 0.902 
Unpredictability 3.643 1.170 6.330 0.842 
Complexity 3.810 1.000 7.000 1.280 
Hostility 4.781 1.000 7.000 1.005 
Industry_service 0.395 0.000 1.000 0.489 





  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 ROA             
2 Progr. output -.029            
3 Del. bureaucrat. .015 -.432***           
4 Del. output .043 .363*** .254***          
5 Anglo-saxon .016 -.189** .200*** -.042         
6 Central Europe -.062 -.030 .027 .063 -.234***        
7 Northern Europe .045 .159*** -.164*** -.027 -.493*** -.731***       
8 Dynamism -.046 -.156*** .134** -.041 .169*** -.064 -.061      
9 Unpredictability .009 -.040 .018 -.001 -.063 -.077* .114*** .345***     
10 Complexity .018 .001 .025 .016 .104** .009 -.081** .151*** .037    
11 Hostility -.018 .046 .035 .054 -.023 .183*** -.148*** .093** -.009 .143***   
12 Industry_service .022 -.040 .008 -.041 -.057 -.016 .054 .097** .027 -.003 .056  
13 Industry_trade .009 .176*** -.095** .042 -.077* -.107*** .150*** -.109*** -.005 -.035 -.025 -.325*** 
 * <0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.001   
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Table 7  
Results of OLS regressions of congruence form fit and contingency form of fit (N=610)  
 Anglo-Saxon Central Europe Northern Europe 
 H1congruence H1contingency H2congruence H2contingency H3congruence H3contingency 
       
Anglo-Saxon  -0.159***      -0.481**     
Program. output control  -0.062     
Anglo x Program Output        0.508**     
Central Europe   0.020 0.064   
Del. bureaucratic control    0.037   
Central x Del. Bureaucratic    -0.130   
Northern Europe      -0.026 -0.379 
Delegated output control      -0.050 
Northern x Del. Output          0.431* 
       
Control variables       
Dynamism       -0.120*** -0.068       0.136*** -0.067 -0.051 -0.047 
Complexity 0.034 0.034 0.000 0.027 0.014 0.029 
Unpredictability -0.009 0.031 -0.027 0.023 0.020 0.017 
Hostility 0.052 -0.014 0.018 -0.007 0.056 -0.019 
Industry_1 0.011 0.036 -0.034 0.031 -0.027 0.034 
Industry_2 0.156 0.021 -0.089** 0.009 0.034 0.011 
       
Dependent variable Program. ROA Delegated ROA Delegated ROA 
 output  bureaucratic  output  
 control  control  control  
       
*p<0.1, **  p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-tailed)     
 
Table 8  
Mean Euclidian distance (reversed) to each of three MCS types (N=610)  
 Anglo- Central  Northern  
 Saxon European European 
 group group group 
 N=83 N=157 N=370 
1. Programmable output control 5.350 5.908 6.144 
2. Delegated bureaucratic control 8.464 7.742 7.462 
3. Delegated output control 6.596 6.851 6.697 
Rankinga 2<3<1 2<3<1 2<3<1 
a) Paired-samples t-test (p<0,001)    
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Figure 1 
Two forms of fit 
 
Table A   Congruence form of fit 
MCS MCS Effectiveness 
Societal 
institutions 
Table B   Contingency form of fit 
Societal 
institutions 
